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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In light of the recent implementation of the Statutory Audit Directive 
(2006/43/EC), changes have been made to the way the statutory 
audit is conducted. The researcher wishes to examine what impact 
this law is having on audit firms and how they are reacting to the 
changes made by it. 
The researcher also wants to examine what changes the auditors 
would like to see made to the current audit process to improve it for 
investors, owners and other stakeholders. 
It is of interest to the researcher to investigate the existence of any 
potential risks to the future of the statutory audit in its current form. 
These issues form the basis of the research questions of this 
dissertation and are listed below. The researcher aims to conduct 
primary research in the form of interviews with auditors, in order to 
attempt to answer the questions. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
There are three research questions to this exploratory study: 
 
1. In light of the recent Statutory Audit Directive (SAD) 
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, what 
effects will it have on the auditing process in your firm? 
 
2. Given your experience of the current audit process, what 
changes would you like to see implemented in the auditing 
process? 
 
3. In your opinion, what are the biggest risks to the future of the 
auditing process in your firm and what are possible ways to 
negate these risks? 
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1.3 Rationale for Research 
The purpose for conducting this research was to gain an insight as to 
how the recent changes of the Statutory Audit Directive (2006/46/EC) 
are being received by the profession, what changes they feel needs to 
be made to the Statutory Audit process and what are potential risks to 
the future of the Statutory Audit. 
 
Rationale for Research 
The rationale for conducting this research is the fact that these are 
turbulent times for the Statutory Audit, with changes recently 
implemented and further changes proposed by the European Union 
for the future. 
The changes that have been recently implemented are the biggest 
changes to occur to the Statutory Audit process in recent times. The 
ability for firms to incorporate their auditing practises is a landmark 
development, a move away from the traditional set-up of partnerships. 
Thus, the researcher wants to examine how these changes signed into 
law by the Statutory Audit Directive (2006/46/EC) are being received 
by the auditing profession and what impact they are having on 
individual firms. The researcher found a lack of literature in the area 
so thought this was an important area requiring research. 
 
The proposed changes put forward by the European Union will further 
modify the way the Statutory Audit is conducted. These proposed 
changes are at an early stage, with the European Union welcoming 
discussion from interested stakeholders, the researcher feels that it is 
necessary to get the opinions of members of the profession as to how 
successful they think the proposed changes would be, and if they 
would detract or improve the current process. 
 
The final area of the research concerns potential risks to the audit 
process. These are important to discover so as safeguards can be 
implemented to reduce the effects of these risks on the profession, and 
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to protect the future of the statutory audit. The researcher felt that 
members of the auditing profession were well situated to offer 
opinions on what are potential risks they feel which could negatively 
affect the Statutory Audit. 
 
1.4 Potential Uses and Limitations of the Research 
The researcher has identified the following potential users of the 
research. 
The professional accountancy bodies could use the research to tailor 
their education programmes for their students to enable that they are 
up to date with the latest developments in the auditing sector. These 
bodies could also make use of the research to stimulate debate on 
certain issues arising in the research for instance, possible 
developments on the future of the Statutory Audit. 
Law-makers and regulators could use the research for this purpose 
also. They can take on board the recommendations made as a result 
of the research conducted to make amendments to the Statutory 
Audit process to make it more effective for stakeholders. 
The researcher believes that the research could be used to inspire 
debate amongst fellow academics and scholars in the area and to 
assist them with their own research. 
Accountancy firms could use the research to discover how other 
members of the profession fell about recent changes and proposed 
changes to the Statutory Auditing process. 
 
The researcher has identified the following limitations of the research.  
Firstly, the researcher was constricted by a lack of resources. With 
regard to time, the research was conducted over the course of the 
academic year and in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the 
Master of Arts in Accounting, so this had to be taking into 
consideration when planning and conducting the research.  
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The researcher also had a limited budget, affecting the scale of the 
investigation by the number of respondents who could be interviewed 
and the location of the respondents, as the researcher had to use 
subjects who proximate. A large scale investigation could not be 
conducted. 
There is the possibility of researcher bias in interpretation of 
responses as the information is of a qualitative nature, and relatively 
subjective in nature. There may be researcher bias with 
preconceptions about the topic being investigated. 
 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
There follows a presentation of the Literature on the topic in chapter 
2. The methodology of the primary research conducted is detailed in 
chapter 3. The findings of the primary research are presented in 
chapter 4. The researcher presents the recommendations and 
conclusions derived from the findings in chapter 5. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to detail the problems about which 
research is to be undertaken. 
 
2.2 History of the Audit 
The main reason for an audit is the "Agency Theory" concept. The 
"Principal" (providers of capital, shareholders) have different interests 
from the "Agents" (users of that capital, management/directors). Nolan 
M. (2010) suggests that the growth of publicly-owned companies after 
the "Industrial Revolution" has resulted in greater separation of 
owners and management. 
A supplementary justification is the enhanced credibility the audit 
provides to the financial statements of the company as derived by the 
auditor's qualification and the ability of the audit to enhance decision- 
making of directors (Cosserat & Rodda 2009). 
 
The annual accounts of limited liability companies are now required to 
be audited under European Law (Fourth Council Directive 
78/660/EEC, Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC, 
91/674/EEC). As Ireland is a member of the European Union, we 
subscribe to this. Section 160 of the Companies Act 1963 requires all 
companies to appoint an auditor. However, Section 32 of the 
Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1999, as amended by Section 53 
of Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act 2003 and Section 9 of 
Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 
2006, states that companies meeting certain criteria are exempt from 
the statutory audit. The criteria are as follows: average number of 
employees for the period not greater than 50, turnover not exceeding 
€7.3 million and Balance sheet total does not exceed €3.65 million. 
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Overall Objective 
ISA 200: Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the 
Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with International Standards on 
Auditing (APB, 2010), defines the objective of a financial statement 
audit as follows: 
 "The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence 
on intended users in the financial statements. This is achieved by the 
expression of an opinion by the auditor on whether the financial 
statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
applicable financial reporting framework." 
       (APB (2010), P: 246(3)) 
 
By its definition, the audit proposes conflicts. 
Firstly, who are the "intended users" of the FS? Does the report apply 
solely to current shareholders, potential future shareholders, 
suppliers, lenders of credit? The "stakeholders" (interested parties) 
involved need to be known for liability consequences as the auditor 
may have a duty of care to these parties. There have been many cases 
throughout the years regarding this issue. For example, Royal Bank of 
Scotland versus Bannerman, Johnstone & MaClay [2005] and Caparo 
Industries plc v Dickman [1990]. 
 
In Caparo, it was held that an auditor had a duty of care to a third 
party if they knew the identity of the third party, knew the nature of 
the contemplated decision (i.e. making an investment), that the 
advices or information would be passed to a third party and that it 
was very likely that the third party would rely on that advice. It was 
rejected that the auditors owed a duty of care to all prospective 
investors or individual shareholders (Keane 2008). 
In the case of "Bannerman", the court found against the auditor that 
they had a duty of care towards RBS, based on rulings in the "Caparo" 
case (ACCA (2008)).  
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As a result of this many of the professional accountancy bodies (CAI, 
ICAEW, ICAS & CPA) advised their members to include a 
"Bannerman" paragraph or a disclaimer which negates liability to 
third parties. 
This is the most recent change and shows a precedent that the audit 
process and reporting requirements can change. 
 
The second problem that arises is "expression of opinion". The auditor 
does not "certify" the FS of the company, they merely give an opinion. 
This is because of the use of "sampling" as a technique of gathering 
audit evidence. The auditor does not look at every transaction of the 
company, but a sample of transactions. This is because the additional 
costs of checking every transaction would outweigh the benefit 
achieved. ISA 530: Audit Sampling (APB, 2010) provides auditors with 
guidance in selecting an appropriate sample, in an attempt to negate 
the risks of sampling, such as misstatements found in the sample, the 
sample being representative of the entire population and methods of 
sample design, size and selection. 
 
"Materiality" is the third issue that arises from the definition. This is 
how important a single item is in the FS, and the degree of accuracy 
to which the auditor works. ISA 320: Materiality in Planning and 
Performing an Audit, (APB, 2010) states that a "misstatement, or 
omission, is material if they individually or in aggregate could 
reasonably be expected to influence the decisions of users". 
 
The "applicable financial reporting framework" is the final area which 
causes concern. This is the laws and regulations to which the FS are 
prepared. These may cause problems if users of the FS are not 
familiar with their contents. They pose a problem for auditors, who 
must be familiar with their contents to ensure they are not giving a 
wrong opinion stating a company is complaint when they are not. 
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An "Expectation Gap" arises as a result of these issues (Liggio (1974) 
is credited by Boyd (2000) as the first user of this term). Cosserat and 
Rodda (2009) acknowledge that auditing practises have evolved since 
the early 1990s in response to growing public expectations of 
accountability; however regardless of this a gap continues to exist. 
Directors and/or shareholders may believe that the auditor does 
certify that the FS are free from all misstatements and no fraud is 
taking place in the company. However the opinion is based on the 
results of the "sample". 
Nolan R. (2010) presents the notion of an "accounting (policy) 
expectation gap" as well as an audit expectation gap, which would 
increase the gulf in notions of what is provided by the service.  
 
As a result of these "Gaps", the audit profession can come in for 
criticism, when they issue "clean" or unqualified opinions on 
companies who fail or go out of business in the period subsequent to 
the audit. However the auditors may well have fulfilled their 
obligations in relation to conduct of the audit. 
Costello (2010) acknowledges that this "Gap" is the traditional defence 
of the industry and raises the question if fulfilling their statutory 
requirements with regard to the audit is sufficient or should firms be 
more proactive with issues of independence and issuing opinions. It 
appears that Costello (2010) feels auditors should take more 
responsibility and strive for better segregation where issues 
surrounding independence and quality of the opinion occur. 
The above issues are recognised as inherent weaknesses of the audit. 
Regulators and law-makers try to combat these by remaining active in 
modifying the audit process to make it better fit end-users needs. 
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2.3 The Nature of the Statutory Audit 
As mentioned above, the auditor uses the technique of "sampling" as a 
method of gathering evidence in order to express an opinion as to 
whether or not the books, records and accounts of the company gives 
a "true and fair view" (Hoffman and Arden (1983), Section 393 
Companies Act 2006), that is not materially misstated. This means 
that the auditor may not examine every transaction in the company's 
accounts as this would be too time-consuming and costly. This is a 
common method of obtaining evidence in a "risk-based" approach to 
the audit, a method used to audit large companies with excellent 
internal controls, where examination of every transaction is difficult 
(Millichamp 2008). 
The auditor plans the audit in accordance with guidance given in ISA 
300: Planning an Audit of Financial Statements and ISA 530: Audit 
Sampling (APB 2010). These alert the auditor to important areas for 
consideration and how to develop a sample so that it is representative 
of the population of transactions. If an auditor's sample selection 
methods are inappropriate they may miss out on important 
misstatements and give an inappropriate opinion. 
This can increase the problems associated with the "Expectation Gap". 
 
2.4 Corporate Scandals 
In light of the recent corporate scandals of the past twenty years, 
regulators have taking significant steps aimed at restoring investor 
confidence in the Audit. O'Connor (2011) recently stated that a "key 
strategic theme to ensure the viability and standing of the Institute (of 
Chartered Accountants, Ireland) going forward" is to repair the 
reputation of the profession. 
 
The most notable scandal was Enron, where related parties were used 
to conceal losses by the company (Millichamp 2008), and to a lesser 
extent Tyco, WorldCom and Parmalat. 
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Auditors were heavily criticised for neglecting their duties (Wearing 
2005). The independence of the audit firms was called into question. 
Critics argued that a firm could not give a fully unbiased, independent 
view, if it was receiving a significant proportion of its fees from non-
audit work ($25m for audit, $27m for non-audit). The firms were 
receiving large amounts for consultancy and professional fees for 
tasks such as implementing computer systems (Wearing 2005). 
 
The culmination of the Enron disaster was large amounts of investors 
losing their savings, job losses of the staff at the company, the demise 
of the accountancy and auditing firm Arthur Andersen (Wearing 
2005), and the introduction of the US Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 on 
Corporate Governance, prohibiting auditors simultaneously providing 
certain non-audit services, such as book-keeping, IT systems 
implementation, (Section 201, US Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002). 
 
Disaster cases, such as Enron and other instances where auditing is 
in the news does increase the issuance of "going-concern" related 
modifications to audit reports as auditors become more conservative 
about their opinions (Feldmann & Read, 2010). The "going-concern" 
assumption is that "the entity is viewed as continuing in business for 
the foreseeable future" (ISA 570: Going Concern, APB, 2010) and 
accounts are prepared on this assumption. Therefore the audit 
opinion is given on this assumption. A "going-concern" modification is 
when the auditor is of the opinion that the entity will not be in 
business for the foreseeable future. 
 
These results question the quality of audit reports in times with little 
incidents of auditors in the news or scandal and if auditors are 
performing well enough in these times. This may call into question 
whether or not auditors are fulfilling their duties to an appropriate 
standard.  
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The EU is taking action now through the SAD, as stated by Lambe 
and Kenny (2010):  
"this directive can arguably be seen as a product of the financial 
scandals of the early noughties such as Enron and Parmalat". 
 
2.5 Statutory Audit Directive 
The European Communities (Statutory Audits) (Directive 
2006/43/EC) Regulations 2010 were signed into Irish law on 20 May 
2010. The purpose of the Directive is to strengthen and support the 
statutory audits role and ensure equivalent standards are applied 
across the European Union (McAlpine, 2010). 
 
As a result of the Directive, the Irish Auditing and Accounting 
Supervisory Authority (IAASA) are now responsible for inspecting the 
audits of Public Interest Entities (PIEs). These are companies whose 
transferable securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market 
of any member state (of the EU) (Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC), 
credit institutions (Article 1 of Directive 2000/12/EC) and insurance 
undertakings (Article 2(1) of Directive 91/674/EEC). This is no longer 
a task of the Irish Accountancy bodies (Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA), Certified Public Accountants (CPA), 
Chartered Accountants of Ireland (CAI),). This is a move to restore 
investor confidence in light of corporate scandals, as it was the 
accountancy bodies in charge of supervision then. 
Auditors of PIEs now have a requirement to issue a "transparency 
report" with details of governance matters (Regulation 58). 
IAASA also has responsibility for overseeing how the accountancy 
bodies monitor the quality of statutory audits, an additional 
disclosure required by bodies. 
 
However McAlpine (2010) writes that the Regulations bring statutory 
underpinning for the existing supervising structures rather than 
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change them. The effects of these on the profession are a concern for 
the researcher to investigate how auditors are now ensuring 
compliance with these rules. 
 
Auditors now have the option of forming limited liability companies 
(Regulation 6). It will be interesting to see what the profession thinks 
about this development and its impact on improving the audit 
process. If auditors do form limited liability companies, then who will 
audit them. A member of the competition may be getting an insight 
into their work practises. Spicer and Fahy (2011) identify a number of 
benefits of incorporating an audit practice, namely limited liability, 
ability to sell shares and certain tax efficiencies for example 
corporation tax of 12.5%. However, the authors recognise some 
disadvantages of incorporation. There are increased administration 
and filing requirements and perhaps some tax issues regarding "close 
company" status of the newly incorporated company. The researcher 
feels that with the knowledge auditors possess derived from their 
qualification, compliance with these regulations should not prove too 
difficult for the company. 
 
With regard to "Change of Auditor", amendments have been made 
allowing oversight of the reasons for the change (Regulation 62). The 
auditor and the company now have to inform IAASA when a change 
occurs. This may add to the administration costs for the company. 
 
The sharing of information between predecessor and successor 
auditors has also been included in the directive (Regulation 47). This 
is an attempt to reduce risks associated with unfamiliarity in "year 1" 
of the audit. This may be a step towards helping reduce the "Big 4's" 
concentration in the market (McAlpine 2010). The issue is the unfair 
advantage the "Big 4" has in gaining new clients, whose shareholders 
perceive mid-tier firms as not qualified or experienced enough to 
conduct the audit of the company. This perception means the mid-tier 
 17 
firms have trouble accessing this market. The Commission is 
concerned that in the event of a failure of a "Big 4" firm, the audit 
profession may suffer negatively. 
 
Auditor Independence 
Specific prohibitions are enforced on people who are too close to the 
company from auditing it (Regulation 71). Where PIEs are concerned 
provision is made for rotation of key audit partners after seven years 
in that role and a rule where an audit partner responsible for the 
company's audit cannot take up a management role in the company 
within two years of leaving as auditor (Regulation 78). 
Additional provisions include assessing non-audit services provided by 
the auditor (Regulation 120). As stated by McAlpine (2010), this adds 
statutory underpinning to preferred practises as recommended by the 
Auditing Standards. 
 
Auditors must document in the audit working papers "all significant 
threats to independence and related safeguards to mitigate threats" 
(Regulation 73). This again is aimed at restoring investor confidence in 
the audit reporting process and its effectiveness in the eyes of the 
profession is intriguing. 
 
Auditors of PIEs are required to annually provide written confirmation 
of independence to the audit committee, and discuss any threats to 
independence along with safeguards implemented (Regulation 72). The 
audit committee is the committee of independent directors charged 
with communication with auditors and ensuring the integrity of the 
FS (FRC 2010). 
 
All remuneration to the auditors must be classified under the 
following headings: audit, other assurance, tax advisory and other 
non-audit (Regulation 120) in an effort to increase disclosure from 
current practises. 
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Group Audits 
The group auditor must take full responsibility for the audit report on 
group accounts (Regulation 55). An appropriate review of working 
papers of other auditors used in the audit must be undertaking by the 
main audit engagement partner. This is and extension of the work of 
the auditor from current requirements, as previously the group 
auditor was not responsible for component auditor's (other auditors 
used in the process) work. ISA 600: Audits of Group Financial 
Statements gives guidance on this. 
 
Audit Committees 
Committees are given additional roles to monitor the financial 
reporting process, monitoring the effectiveness of the entity's internal 
control, internal audit, risk management, monitoring the statutory 
audit of annual accounts, monitoring the independence of the auditor 
and provision of non-audit services (Regulation 91). 
 
Signing of Audit Reports 
Regulation 57 states that the audit report must be signed on behalf of 
the firm, personally by the engagement partner, rather than just the 
firm's name. 
 
McAlpine (2010) questions whether the audit report itself should be 
amended to better fulfil end-users requirements. The researcher 
would like to investigate possible ways in which it could be adjusted. 
 
These are the most recent and most dramatic changes that have been 
implemented on the auditing profession for sometime and the 
researcher has found very little commentary on the area. It is for that 
reason the researcher wishes to obtain the view of the profession on 
the above matters. These responses will be of critical importance and 
are necessary in answering the first research question to the study 
and will form the basis of primary data collection. 
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2.6 EU Green Paper: "Audit Policy – Lessons From the Crisis" 
Lambe and Kenny (2010) comment that the "status quo" is not an 
option for the future of the audit. The criticisms faced by the audit 
community are driving a call for reform of the process. Auditors want 
to return the audit to a place of special importance, enhancing the 
credibility of an organisations FS. 
This is the view of Powell (2010), who wants the "leaders" of the 
auditing profession to take charge and reform the process.  
Powell (2010) lists the six topics PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) is 
implementing in order to restore confidence in the audit.  
Firstly, they are aiming to raise quality control of the audit process to 
eliminate any inappropriate opinions given on the FS. 
Secondly, they are improving the transparency of scope, decision-
making, processes and communication of the auditors to 
stakeholders, perhaps through the audit committee's report. 
Thirdly, they are examining how changes can be made to reporting 
requirements to improve them. Powell (2010) has identified using the 
narrative information that goes with the audit report as a vehicle for 
achieving this. One issue the researcher believes may occur here is 
the difficulty in regulating this information. As it is supplementary to 
the audit report, how liable are the auditors for "signing-off" on such 
information if it proves to be inappropriate.  
Fourth, PWC are looking to improve standards for reporting and 
auditing to give clearer and better assured information. 
Fifth, PWC want a more long term agenda established with regulators 
and other market participators to reform the role of reporting and 
auditing in supporting a well functioning market. 
Finally PWC aim to encourage their clients to offer better information 
regarding business strategy and performance. Again regulation of this 
may prove difficult. 
 
These recommendations are similar to the issues raised in the 
European Green Paper issued in October 2010 regarding auditor 
 20 
communication with stakeholders and perhaps add weight to the 
Green Paper's argument for reform in those areas. 
The views of the profession to these changed work practises will be is 
of importance along with their views on how successful or 
unsuccessful they will be and if they should be implemented in all 
audits and preparation of FS. 
 
It is such thinking and desire for reform that has led the EU to issue a 
Green Paper investigating potential reforms of the audit process. A 
Green Paper is a document published by the European Commission to 
stimulate discussion on given topics at European Level 
(www.europa.eu). They invite individuals or organisations to 
participate in the consultation process and debate on the issues they 
put forward. Green Papers may give rise to legislative developments 
that are then outlined in White Papers, which are documents 
containing proposals for Community action in a specific area 
(www.europa.eu). The paper addresses the following areas. 
 
Role of the Auditor 
Communication by auditors to stakeholders 
This area of the paper deals with what information the auditors 
should provide to the stakeholders, that is the directors and 
shareholders of the company. Nolan R. (2010) believes that confidence 
in the role of the auditor would be enhanced if there was more 
visibility around what took place during the audit process. 
One proposal put forward is that additional communication could be 
made on the methodology of the audit. The Commission wants to see 
the audit "go back to basics". That is return to more substantive 
verification of the balance sheet and less reliance on the compliance 
aspect, which they believe should be the responsibility of the 
company. The Commission believes this should be achieved through 
the "Internal Audit" function of the company; however they may lack 
the required expertise. This returns us to the problem where the 
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auditor may be used in a "non-audit" context to verify these 
requirements, perhaps hindering objectivity and independence. 
The Commission recommends that disclosure of directly verified 
components should be made. This is one area where the audit report 
may be amended. 
Costello (2010) suggests that the "Materiality" level to which the 
auditor works should be disclosed on the FS. This would obviously 
increase communication and transparency, an aim of the reforms. 
 
Auditor behaviour 
The Commission wants to see the auditor become more questioning 
and sceptical of management's representations with regard to the FS, 
issuing "emphasis of matter" paragraphs where necessary. The 
auditor uses this option to draw attention to certain elements of the 
FS, for example going-concern issues or potential litigation the 
company faces (Nolan M., 2010). The researcher feels that the 
Commission wants this option more aggressively followed. This is not 
a new element of the report; however, if it is used more aggressively 
can aid disclosure and communication to the stakeholders. 
 
The Audit Report 
The Commission questions the negativity associated with a "qualified" 
audit report. The Commission feels that a statement on the "relative 
performance" of the company and a report on the "potential risks, 
sectoral evaluation, commodity and exchange rate risk coupled with 
the auditor's report may bring more value to stakeholders.  
Further areas of disclosure to these have been suggested by the 
Chartered Accountants of Ireland (2011) such as corporate 
governance disclosure and operation of internal controls. Nolan R. 
(2010) questions the ability of general purpose financial statements to 
satisfy the needs of all stakeholders of the company and suggests the 
issue of additional "tailored" reports or narrative comments made by 
the author. 
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Nolan R. (2010) surmises investor's willingness for the audit 
committee to report in the annual report of the company in a bid to 
improve investor confidence.  
 
One issue that may arise here is the increased costs associated with 
providing such reports. This may be perceived as not adding sufficient 
value to the FS of smaller companies, perhaps which are owner-
managed compared with the cost incurred. 
The IOSCO and IAASB are both currently questioning how the report 
can be improved (Green Paper). 
 
Communication 
The Commission feels that better communication between auditors 
and stakeholders may improve the quality of the audit. 
The Commission cites the German legislation's requirement for 
auditors to provide a report to the directors where they summarise in 
greater detail than the audit report the findings of the audit. 
The researcher would question if this should be made available to 
shareholders also. 
 
Extension of Auditor's Mandate 
The audit of FS is on an historical basis. The Commission raises the 
question whether auditors could take a more forward looking 
approach to examination, in addition to "going concern" issues. This 
could be achieved issuing reports on internal controls, risk 
management techniques or innovation procedures employed by the 
company. 
 
Governance and Independence of Audit Firms 
The Commission questions whether the auditor appointment of large 
companies and/or systemic financial institutions should be the task 
of a third party. Whilst conceding this would increase bureaucracy, 
increased societal benefits may be achieved. Some difficulties would 
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be how the process would work, how the third party got paid, 
independence, liability, increased costs as third party may have to 
make a profit. 
 
The Commission wishes to examine the issue of mandatory rotation of 
audit firms – not just partners. The Commission feels this is necessary 
to give the impression of complete independence. Currently legislation 
provides for rotation of partner after seven years where the company 
is a listed company. However there may be increased costs associated 
with this. Regulation 47 of the SAD may help reduce this burden as 
auditors are now obliged to provide information to successor auditors. 
 
Non-Audit Services 
In France, and the US as a result of Sarbanes Oxley 2002, a total ban 
of auditor providing non-audit services to audit clients is in operation. 
This is left to the discretion of national governments to decide in other 
EU member states. The Commission is examining whether a total ban 
should be applied throughout all EU member states. 
 
Costello (2010) feels the end result of this may be the creation of "pure 
audit firms". The impact of this on competition and cost needs to be 
examined. However "pure audit firms" may reduce the "Expectation 
Gap". The views of the profession on these matters will be useful in 
examining potential changes to the process. 
 
Supervision 
The Commission wishes to see increased dialogue between the 
regulators and the auditors. This may not be to the pleasing of the 
audit profession; however increased supervision is an important 
aspect of increasing user confidence in the audit report. 
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Concentration and Market Structure 
The Commission is concerned at the inability of mid-tier firms at 
breaking the "Big 4's" hold on the market for audit of listed 
companies. They have proposed the concept of "Joint Audits", 
currently enforced in France, where listed companies are required to 
appoint two firms of auditors who are required to both sign-off on the 
audit report. They hope that this will help mid-tier firms enter the 
market, by perhaps not allowing two "Big 4" firms to work on an audit. 
"Big 4" firms may not be happy about this as they may be giving away 
some of their expertise to their rivals. Research by Chang, et al (2010) 
shows that after the Enron Crisis and subsequent introduction of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, smaller firms became more successful in 
attracting companies over their "Big 4 " rivals, due to increased 
regulation increasing audit quality and because such a large firm as 
Arthur Andersen could fail. The Commission may hope changes 
implemented may have a similar effect in Europe. 
As mentioned, one key fear the Commission holds for the future of the 
audit is the demise of a member of the "Big 4". Allowing mid-tier firms 
to demonstrate their ability to perform quality audits may be a way of 
negating this fear to a certain extent. 
 
Mandatory Rotation 
The Commission sees mandatory rotation of audit firms as well as 
auditors as a way of enhancing independence of auditors. This is to 
prevent a familiarity threat occurring where the auditors become too 
close too management/directors, losing their objectivity and 
scepticism. 
The Commission wants mandatory tendering for audits with full 
transparency of the criteria to which the auditor will be appointed. 
Quality and independence should be key selection criteria. 
The Commission wants to examine the issue of "Big 4 only" covenants 
demanded by certain financial institutions, as reported by 
Christodoulou (2010). One possible remedy to this might be the 
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creation of a European Quality certification to demonstrate firms with 
the ability to conduct audits of these large companies. 
 
Creation of a European Market 
The Commission proposes a "European Passport" for auditors to move 
between member states, as a way of breaking down "barriers to entry" 
for auditors. Such barriers as Articles no.3 and no.14 of the Directive, 
which require approval and registration in each state and an aptitude 
test to be undertaken. 
The Commission feels this would encourage more competition in the 
market for large audits because it would simplify the development of 
European audit networks along with reducing the costs of providing 
audits on a Europe-wide basis.  
However, care needs to be given that the "Big 4" do not create an even 
bigger hold on the market, as transfer of skill and people would prove 
easier for them, perhaps resulting in scale economies with training 
and opportunities for travel. 
 
Simplification: SMEs 
While recognising benefits to SMEs such as enhanced credibility of 
financial information, the Commission understands that the statutory 
audit can be an "administrative burden". 
The commission proposes the creation of a specific environment for 
the SME audit by discouraging the statutory audit, implementing a 
"limited-audit" or "statutory review", where auditors would perform 
limited procedures so as to detect misstatements due to fraud or 
error. The views of the banks to this would be imperative as very often 
an audit is undertaken to gain access to credit (Tauringana and 
Clarke (2000), Collis, J., Jarvis, R. and Skerratt, L. (2004)). 
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Simplification: SMPs 
If a "limited audit or statutory review" is implemented for SMEs, the 
Commission would like to see regulation proportionately reduced, so 
as not to over-burden SMPs with administrative costs.  
 
These are the issues raised in the Green Paper and are potential 
changes proposed by the EU. This issue forms the basis of the second 
research question of the dissertation and therefore the researcher 
wishes to get the respondent's opinions on these as viable options for 
change and to see what they feel will be most successful. The 
researcher also proposes to give the respondents the opportunity to 
put forward their own proposals as to how the Statutory Audit process 
could be improved. 
 
One limitation of the Literature Review has been the difficulty in 
presenting an unbiased view of the topic of reform of the statutory 
audit. This may be attributed to the fact that, in its current form, the 
statutory audit process is deemed no longer fit for purpose, and hence 
in need of reform, a view reinforced by Lambe and Kenny (2010). 
Therefore there is no contemporary literature available in support of 
the audit in its current format. This is the most likely reason, backed 
up by the fact that the European powers have amended the process by 
implementing the SAD. One aim of the process has been to restore the 
confidence of end-users in the audited financial statements (FS) of an 
entity.  
It is for the above reason that the researcher has decided to undertake 
research in the area with the aim that it may be used in support of 
this reform process. 
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2.7 Potential Risks to the Future of the Statutory Audit 
The final research question deals with the topic of potential risks to 
the future of the Statutory Audit. The researcher feels it is important 
to get the views of the individual as to what they feel are the most 
pressing risks which could jeopardise the future of the audit practise. 
These individuals are best placed to provide the researcher with this 
information. The researcher feels that possible examples could be the 
possible occurrence of another Enron-type scandal or the auditor 
failing to identify certain frauds. 
In light of the contemporary debate on change associated with the 
current statutory audit process, the researcher feels that if certain 
risks could be identified from the research, then these should be 
taken into account by the regulators and law-makers, and if possible 
make amendments to protect the future of the auditing profession, 
safeguarding both jobs and the integrity of the audit process and 
report. 
 
Due to certain limitations already mentioned in the Introduction 
chapter, the researcher feels it is necessary to conduct this research 
with relatively small audit practises, proximate to the researcher and 
to examine the impact of these issues on their practises. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
The researcher intends to conduct primary research by interviewing 
auditors to obtain their views on the above issues, so that answers 
may be derived and presented in the dissertation. It is central to this 
study that the opinions of the profession on the SAD and Green Paper 
are explored and examined to determine the effectiveness of changes 
made and of any proposed changes which may be made to the 
auditing process, in order to improve investor confidence in the 
process. It is also of interest to the researcher to obtain the 
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profession's views on any potential risks to the future of the statutory 
audit so that safeguards may be developed to protect it. 
 
The research methodology used by the researcher will now be outlined 
in the following chapter. 
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3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research philosophy this dissertation is set 
in. The data collection methods are detailed along with data analysis 
techniques adopted by the researcher. Possible limitations of the 
research are presented. 
The aim of this chapter is to detail why the researcher has adopted 
the specified techniques for data collection and analysis. 
 
Research is a process of inquiry and investigation that is systematic 
and methodical, undertaking to increase knowledge in an area (Collis 
& Hussey 2003). 
Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on 
a distinct methodological tradition of inquiry that explores a social or 
human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, 
analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants and conducts the 
study in a natural setting (Creswell 1998). 
 
3.2 Research Questions 
There are three research questions to this exploratory study: 
 
1. In light of the recent Statutory Audit Directive (SAD) 
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, what 
effects will it have on the auditing process in your firm? 
 
The aim of this research question will be to query what impact, if any, 
the SAD will have on the audit process in the subjects firm and if in 
their opinion these will be for the betterment of the process or if they 
will detract from the current process. 
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2. Given your experience of the current audit process, what 
changes would you like to see implemented in the auditing 
process? 
 
The issuance of a "Green Paper" may be the instigation of further 
change to the statutory audit process. This study is concerned with 
investigating the individual's opinions, given their experience in their 
own firm, on what they would like to see changed in the statutory 
audit process, under these areas. 
 
3. In your opinion, what are the biggest risks to the future of the 
auditing process in your firm and what are possible ways to 
negate these risks? 
 
Discovering any potential risks to the future of the statutory audit 
process is important, as appropriate safeguards could be put in place 
to reduce such risks somewhat. The researcher intends to get the 
opinions of the subjects to these risks, assess their viability and 
seriousness, the effects of these risks if left unconstrained and 
investigate possible ways to negate the adverse affects of these. 
 
3.3 Research Philosophy 
Creswell (1998) believes that qualitative researchers approach their 
studies with a certain "paradigm" – which is a basic set of beliefs or 
assumptions that guide their inquiries. Guba and Lincoln (1988) as 
cited by Creswell (1998) states that this paradigm is influenced by 
certain factors. 
"Ontological" issues dealing with the nature of reality. This is how the 
researcher views the area of research and has an influence on which 
data collection methods should be used.  
"Epistemological" is the relationship between the researcher and that 
being researched. 
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"Methodological" refers to the research process. 
 
Quantitative versus Qualitative 
Hair et al (2007) has identified the following characteristics are typical 
of qualitative data. It is more useful for discovering new information. It 
provides in-depth information on a few characteristics. It uses more 
unstructured data collection techniques requiring subjective 
interpretation. There is less concern for representativeness. An 
emphasis is placed on the trustworthiness of respondents. The 
researcher conducts relatively long interviews with small sample sizes. 
The interviewer actively probes for responses. Results are relatively 
subjective. Quantitative data demonstrates the opposite of the above 
characteristics. 
 
Positivism 
This is on one extreme of the research paradigm continuum. The 
characteristics of this paradigm are that it is largely quantitative in 
nature. It developed from the physical sciences and uses statistics to 
prove/disprove predetermined hypothesis to be tested under 
controlled conditions (Kumar 1996). This is seen as a deductive 
approach to presentation of results. 
Collis and Hussey (2003) have identified the following criticisms of the 
positivistic paradigm in that it treats people as being separate from 
social contexts and does not take account of their perceptions. It has 
a highly structured research design which imposes constraints on the 
results. 
 
Interpretivism 
The opposite paradigm is the interpretivist approach. This approach is 
more qualitative in nature (Kumar 1996). The characteristic of this 
approach is that it seeks to explain human behaviour or perceptions. 
It is more subjective than positivism and requires more 
"interpretation" from the researcher's perspective as there is little or 
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no statistics used. There is often a lack of generalisability of results 
which could be attributed to the entire population. It uses an 
inductive approach and attempts to identify patterns to produce 
results (Mason 2002). 
 
Philosophy Adopted 
The researcher has implemented an interpretivist approach to the 
dissertation as this is more suited to obtaining the relevant qualitative 
data relating to the research objectives and questions, for exploring 
the opinions and perceptions of the auditing profession. There will be 
four semi-structured interviews, using interviewer interpretation of 
their opinions in the Findings and Analysis chapter which follows. 
This is a subjective approach and may be biased by the researcher. 
 
3.4 Research Focus 
There are three broad classifications of research: Exploratory, 
Descriptive and Explanatory. 
 
Exploratory 
Hair et al (2007) recognise that this approach to research is useful 
where a better understanding of the problem is required. It is designed 
to explore opinions on the proposed issue, to gain a deeper 
understanding of the problem. Collis and Hussey (2003) suggest that 
it is useful where no previous study has been undertaken in the area. 
 
Descriptive  
Hair et al (2007) state that descriptive research is used to obtain data 
that describes the characteristics of the research area. 
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Explanatory 
This type of research aims to clarify why there is a relationship 
between two aspects of a problem (Kumar 1996) and to understand 
the problem (Collis and Hussey 2003). 
 
Research Focus Adopted 
The nature of this dissertation will be Exploratory, as the researcher 
aims to gain an insight into the opinions of the audit profession on the 
issues raised in the research questions. An Exploratory approach is 
useful are there has been no previous research carried out on the 
area. There are elements of descriptive research as the researcher 
aims to describe how the changes have impacted on the audit 
profession. 
 
Sampling Technique 
The sampling technique employed by the researcher will be 
convenience sampling, which is selecting sample elements that are 
most readily available to participate in the study and can provide the 
information required. 
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3.5 Data Collection Methods 
Hair, et al (2007) has identified the following data collection methods 
suitable for qualitative data and quantitative data. 
 
 
Hair, et al. (2007:192) 
 
As the researcher is investigating data of a qualitative nature the two 
methods of data collection applicable are Observation and 
Interviewing. 
 
Observation 
As identified by Hair et al (2007), observation is a method of gathering 
qualitative data. This involves examining individuals over a period of 
time. However this would not be an appropriate method of data 
collection for this dissertation as the researcher aims to gather the 
opinions and perceptions of subjects not there actions and behaviours 
where observation is more useful for collecting such data. 
 
Interviews 
This is where the researcher speaks directly to the respondent. Mason 
(2002) has identified the following characteristics of interviewing. 
Data Collection 
Secondary Data 
Primary Data 
Qualitative Data Quantitative Data 
Interview Observation Observation Survey 
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There is an interactional exchange of dialogue. Interviews are 
relatively informal in style and approach. Interviews require themes or 
topics to which they will follow, in order that the researcher gains the 
relevant information from their subjects. The use of interviews can 
make comparing findings easier (Collis and Hussey 2003). The subject 
is a source of knowledge to the researcher and their perception of the 
research area is important to the researcher. 
As previously stated the ontological position of the researcher is 
reflected in the method. Interviews are particularly helpful in 
gathering data when dealing with complex issues and are 
characteristic of a qualitative, interpretivistic approach. The use of 
open-ended questions allows subjects to respond freely and does not 
limit their responses to pre-determined options. 
Mason (2002) recognises that the use of interviews means the 
researcher is going to be active and reflective in the data generating 
process, rather that a neutral data collector. 
The researcher has decided to use interviews as the method of data 
collection as the researcher is looking to gain the perceptions of the 
audit community of recent changes to the statutory audit process, 
potential future changes to the statutory audit process and potential 
risks to the future of the audit. 
 
Unstructured Interviews 
These are interviews where the researcher conducts the interview with 
no rigid plan. These can be time consuming and may result in 
subjects being asked different questions, making comparing and 
analysing results difficult (Collis and Hussey 2003). 
Mason (2002) is critical of the terminology "unstructured" as she 
believes that the interview must have some structure in order to 
ensure that sufficient appropriate data is collected for the purpose of 
the research. 
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Structured 
These interviews follow a structured predetermined construct, where 
the subjects are asked identical questions. 
 
Semi-structured 
These interviews are situated between structured and unstructured. 
The researcher will have a predetermined set of questions or theme 
sheet which they intend to ask the respondents, but have the freedom 
to omit or add additional questions as they see fit, as the interview 
progresses. 
 
Tape Recorded Interviews 
The interviewer, with the permission of the subject may tape-record 
the interview for future analysis and reference. Some commentators 
believe that this may hinder the relationship between the researcher 
and subject as they become conscious of the recording of the 
interview. These may be transcribed and presented in an Appendix to 
the dissertation. 
 
Semi-structured Interviews 
The researcher feels that the use of semi-structured interviews is 
appropriate for this exploratory study. Semi-structured interviews give 
the researcher the freedom to ask probing questions to gain the 
appropriate responses from the subjects in order to satisfy the 
research questions. The questions asked can be open-ended which 
does not restrict the respondent to relatively short, even yes/no 
answers as used in many questionnaires, which may detract from the 
quality of the information obtained. 
The interviews will be planned and questions developed in order that 
the researcher is confident appropriate data will be collected from the 
respondents. 
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The researcher aims to conduct the interviews in the auditor's offices 
to ensure they are comfortable in their surroundings, enhancing the 
data collected. 
The researcher proposes to let the subjects see the questions in 
advance of the interview in order that they are better prepared to 
provide higher quality responses. 
 
Secondary research 
This will constitute analysis of relevant academic journal, 
publications, books and other sources of interest to the researcher 
concerning the research area in order to present the Literature Review 
chapter, which aims to justify the area of research. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
The method of data analysis to be used in the dissertation will be the 
researcher interpreting the subject's responses. This involves using 
Comprehension, acquiring a full understanding of the content and 
Synthesising, drawing together different themes. These elements have 
been identified by Morse (1994) as cited by Collis and Hussey (2003). 
The subjects will be quoted or paraphrased in order to present data 
collected in the following Findings and Analysis chapter. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to detail how the researcher conducted their 
research in order that the research questions can be answered. The 
data collected will now be presented in the Findings and Analysis 
chapter which follows. 
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4 Findings and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter four studies and analyses the results obtained from the 
primary research conducted by the researcher. This involves 
examination of the transcripts of the interview conversations carried 
out with the subjects. This allows the researcher to present the 
findings in order to attempt to satisfy the aforementioned research 
questions of the dissertation. 
 
4.2 Analysis of Interview Findings 
The researcher conducted three depth interviews with local auditors in 
order to gauge the perceptions of the recent Statutory Audit Directive 
and the impact it has had on their practise. It was an aim of the 
research to determine what changes, if any, the subjects felt were 
important to make in order to improve the auditing process for 
companies. The researcher also wished to determine what the subjects 
fell are the biggest risks to the auditing profession moving forward 
into the future. 
The researcher used a list of predetermined questions as a guide in 
order to collect the relevant information to satisfy the research 
questions. However the interviews were semi-structured in nature to 
allow the researcher the freedom to ask additional questions which 
came to mind in light of the subjects responses and to allow for 
further interrogation. The subjects were assured of their anonymity at 
the beginning of the interviews. Transcripts of the interviews can be 
found in the Appendices section of this dissertation. 
 
4.3 Presentation of Findings 
The first question the interviewees were asked was to gauge the scale 
of the firm and the number of audits they conduct every year. 
Interviewee A: There were two employees and the practise conducts 10 
or 12 audits per year. 
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Interviewee B: There were 15 employees and the practise conducts 40 
audits per year. 
Interviewee C: There were 19 employees and the practise conducts 40 
audits per year. 
The researcher felt this was important to ask to ensure the 
respondents were qualified to answer questions based on actually 
conducting audits and to see how active they were in the industry. 
 
In order to satisfy the first research question regarding the Statutory 
Audit Directive the researcher discovered the following findings. 
 
The interviewees were asked if they were aware of the recently 
implemented Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EC) and what it 
entailed. 
All respondents were aware of the Directive, with Interviewee A stating 
that "audit firms can now incorporate. It also states that an individual 
must sign the audit report issued for the company. There is now a duty 
that auditors must provide Transparency Reports when auditing certain 
large entities. There is also the requirement to provide information to 
new auditors" and Interviewees B and C acknowledging the personal 
signing of the reports and the option of incorporation. 
The researcher felt this was an important question to examine if the 
respondents were aware of the Directive, the issues contained in it 
and its impact on their firm, as this is an important area for the 
dissertation, central to the first research question. 
 
The respondents were then asked if they would incorporate the 
auditing section of their firm. 
Interviewees A and C responded that it is currently being examined by 
the partners in the firm at present and that they will decide on it in 
the near future. All respondents acknowledged the low rate of 
Corporation Tax and Limited Liability as advantages of incorporation. 
Interviewees A and C acknowledged that the distinct disadvantages 
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were the additional "Company Secretarial obligations". Interviewee B 
explained that their practise will not be incorporating the auditing 
section of the firm adding "partnership has worked well for us so far". 
Interviewee B later adds that the possibility of requiring an outside 
auditor to examine the company "is probably the main reason myself 
and my partners have decided against incorporating the auditing 
aspect of the firm". 
Therefore it is difficult to gauge at this early stage how many 
companies will incorporate the auditing section of their company, but 
partners agree that there are certain advantages, namely limited 
liability and low corporation tax rate which would apply to the profits 
of the company. 
 
The respondents were asked what firms they felt the ability to 
incorporate would benefit most. The researcher felt this was important 
to ask to see how the ability to incorporate was perceived with regard 
to potential benefits available to firms.  
All respondents felt that the bigger firms would benefit most from the 
ability to incorporate given the potential exposure to large costs when 
auditing large companies or Public Limited Companies (PLC). 
It was expressed that over time most practises would incorporate the 
auditing part of the firm. 
 
A major change from partnership to an incorporated company is the 
potential for an audit, providing the audit exemption thresholds are 
broken. The researcher thought it important to get the respondents 
views on how they would feel about an outsider performing an audit 
on their company, themselves knowing the detailed work that is 
undertaking in an audit. 
Interviewees A and B did not like the thought of having an outsider 
audit their newly incorporated audit company. Interviewee C did not 
have a problem with an outsider conducting an audit on their 
company, but conceded that "this would be a problem for say the Big 4 
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firms or the other larger firms". This issue is a matter for each 
individual firm, and some partners may not like having outsiders 
examining their companies as demonstrated by Interviewees A and B. 
this will probably be an important influencing factor when partners 
are deciding whether or not to incorporate their practise, as 
demonstrated by Interviewee B's response. 
 
The next question was to examine perceptions on an audit report 
issued by a limited liability company and whether or not the 
respondents felt this would reduce the value in the hands of the 
auditee. 
Interviewees A and C believe that receiving an audit report from a 
limited liability company will not detract from the quality of the 
opinion with Interviewee C stating "once people see that the same … 
service is being delivered, … it will just become the norm".  
Interviewee B has a different opinion. They feel that audit work should 
be undertaking without the need to "require the protection of limited 
liability". 
 
Regulation 47 of the SAD provides for predecessor auditors to share 
information with successor auditors. The researcher wished to explore 
the impact of this new regulation on the individual's firms and to see 
how it impacted on work practices. 
All respondents acknowledged that this was, in many instances 
common practice, but that legal enforcement would improve the 
auditing process. 
 
Regulation 120 of the SAD states that all remuneration paid to 
auditors must be disclosed and categorised into the headings of audit, 
other assurance, tax advisory and other non-audit. The researcher 
wished to examine the perceptions this would have on independence. 
Interviewees A and B agreed that it would increase investors 
questioning of independence, with Interviewee C stating that "it 
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should" but that it is up to the perception of individual investors as to 
how effective the auditor is. 
 
Regulation 57 states that the audit report must be signed on behalf of 
the firm, personally by the audit partner in charge. The subjects were 
asked their opinions on this change. 
Interviewees A and C felt this would have no impact on the 
perceptions as it is not a reflection on the quality of work undertaken. 
However Interviewee B believes that it will increase investor confidence 
in the audit report as an individual's name is there rather than simply 
a company's name. It may show more accountability. 
 
IAASA is now responsible for monitoring the audits of Public Interest 
Companies as opposed to the accountancy bodies. The researcher 
wished to examine how this change would impact on the individual's 
firm. 
Interviewee C believed that as it represents increased monitoring it 
will improve the audit of these companies. However Interviewees A 
and B do not agree. Interviewee A believes that the accountancy 
bodies providing strict enough monitoring of these audits, while 
Interviewee B believes that "local, small regulation is not effective" that 
a "European regulatory framework for the auditing profession" is 
required. 
The researcher felt this was an important question to get respondents 
views on regulation. 
 
The above questions were asked to get information on the Statutory 
Audit Directive to enable the first research question to be answered. 
 
The second research question concerned potential changes that the 
individuals wished to see made to the auditing process. 
One vehicle driving change in this area is the issuance of a European 
Union Green Paper. The researcher felt it was necessary to explore the 
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respondents views about potential changes put forward by the Paper 
and how they felt these would impact on the auditing process. The 
researcher wanted to examine if they felt the changes would be for the 
betterment of the auditing process or if other more appropriate 
changes should be made.  
 
Respondents were firstly asked if they were aware of how the process 
of the issuance of a European Green Paper operated. 
Interviewee C was aware of how a Green Paper is issued, however 
Interviewees A and B were not, with Interviewee A saying the "maybe 
the larger audit firms may look at matters at a European level" and 
Interviewee B adding that "it is more important for my firm to learn 
what is actually coming into law for the relevant accounting periods for 
which we are undertaking work".  
This was important information in order to understand the 
respondents' level of knowledge of the process. 
 
The respondents were then asked as to what correspondence the 
professional accountancy bodies release concerning these matters. 
All respondents are aware of the journals, for example Accountancy 
Ireland, which detail these matters. It appears that ensuring 
compliance with newly introduced laws or regulations is more 
important to the respondents than partaking in changing the process 
of how the statutory audit is undertaking, as eluded to by Interviewee 
B's comments. 
Interviewee A, from the smallest practise in terms of employees and 
number of audits conducted, feels that it should be left to the larger 
auditing firms to make suggestions, and perhaps feels insignificant on 
the grand scale in which such a change to the process occurs. 
However interviewee B believes that everyone should have an input 
into the process, in order that smaller companies needs are met. 
Interviewee C feels that the process is conducted so that whoever 
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wants to have an input in the process can, if they choose to take the 
time. 
This was necessary to see if the respondents knew where to find the 
information if they so wished. 
 
One potential change highlighted in the Paper is the possibility of 
mandatory audit firm rotation, as opposed to audit partner rotation as 
is currently the case. The researcher wanted to see how this potential 
change ranked as a viable possibility in the eyes of the profession ad 
the effect it would have on the audit process. 
Interviewees A and B believe that mandatory rotation should occur in 
order to have a more effective audit as "the current firm will be 
conscious of a successor firm following on and reviewing their work". 
However Interviewee C believes this will not solve the problem. They 
believe that increased "independent monitoring" would be more 
appropriate and lead to a more effective audit. 
 
A further change highlighted is prohibiting the auditor from supplying 
any non-audit services, for example accounts preparation, 
consultancy. This is similar to the system in operation in the USA. 
The researcher wished to examine if the respondents felt this would be 
a change for the betterment of the audit process. 
All Interviewees are in agreement that in large companies and PLCs, 
there should not be provision of additional non-audit services by the 
firm who are responsible for auditing the company. They feel this is a 
breach of independence and may compromise their position when 
conducting the audit or issuing an opinion. The respondents are in 
agreement that in smaller companies provision of additional non-audit 
services is not a concern. 
 
The Paper presents the possibility of auditors detailing the materiality 
level to which the audit has been conducted on the audit report, as a 
way of increasing communication to stakeholders. The researcher felt 
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this was an important question to put to the respondents to discover 
their views. 
Interviewee A believes that it should be disclosed, as it details the 
parameters to which the audit has been conducted. However 
Interviewees B and C have a different opinion. Interviewee C states 
that detailing the materiality level may cause more confusion to the 
stakeholders who may "not understand specific issues relating to a 
particular job or that significant differences in Materiality can exist 
between jobs but still provide the same service or assurance". 
Interviewee B has a different argument against disclosure of the 
materiality level. They believe that such information, in the hands of 
the wrong people could be used against the company in order to 
commit fraud as "they know at what level the auditor will not look for". 
One suggestion is that materiality should be better explained on the 
audit report so that investors become more aware of what an audit is. 
 
A similar proposal put forward by the Paper concerning extra 
reporting by the auditor to improve communication by the auditor is 
to verify on the audit report what elements of the accounts have been 
verified. The researcher wishes to examine the viability of this in the 
opinions of the respondents. 
The responses here followed a similar pattern as to the previous 
question, with Interviewee A thinking that these areas should be 
disclosed but Interviewees B and C discouraging of this amendment. 
Again Interviewee A believes it would establish the parameters as to 
what has been verified. However Interviewee C believes this may also 
lead to confusion "if we verify one area in a certain audit and do not do 
it in another audit". Interviewee B is of the opinion that this 
information could be used against the company by someone wishing 
to commit fraud. This is detrimental to the audit process. 
 
Auditors are now being asked to become more forward thinking by 
presenting certain issues to the stakeholders that may happen in the 
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future. The researcher felt it important to get the views of the 
respondents as to how they would feel in providing assurance on 
something which has not even happened yet. 
Interviewee A believes that the role should become more forward 
looking, "to give opinions not just on the financial statements, but also 
on areas such as the company's internal controls, corporate governance 
arrangements and the financial assumptions underlying the business 
model" and "views on the general economic and financial outlook of the 
company". They feel this may reduce the "Expectation Gap" that exists 
between what an audit is and what it is perceived to be by 
stakeholders. However Interviewee B believes, and Interviewee A 
agrees, that stakeholders need to better educate themselves as to 
what an audit is and what it does. 
Interviewees B and C stated that the standards to which they work 
means they must look ahead for the next 12 month period for "going-
concern" issues which may arise, but Interviewee B concedes that 
this, especially in the current economic climate, is difficult. They give 
the example of a company which may lose a key supplier or source of 
credit being put into difficulties. 
 
On the issue of Public Interest Companies, it is proposed that an 
independent third party is set-up to select the auditors for such 
entities. The researcher wanted to know how the respondents would 
feel dealing with such a party and factors which would be important 
to its success. 
Interviewee A believes the procedure should be used, but "the 
selection process was transparent and based on a defined set of 
parameters, whereby every tendering audit firm has equal 
opportunity, this should make it better". Interviewee B was more 
sceptical, afraid the process may become corrupted, with interviewee 
C wanting more effective independent monitoring of the profession. 
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Another proposed change for the audit of such entities is a "joint 
audit". The researcher wanted to see what the respondents felt about 
this as a proposition as to how these institutions are audited. 
Interviewees A and B believed that it would improve the audit of such 
entities, however Interviewee C conceded that it may be "very hard to 
manage and perhaps the responsibility for the audit opinion may be 
diminished". 
 
The researcher wished to find out what the respondents felt was the 
value of an audit to small company and its future in this context. 
All respondents conceded that an audit was of little value to such a 
company as the management are generally able to keep tabs on how 
the company is performing. Interviewee A believes that it may identify 
areas of weak management or areas susceptible to fraud as the only 
possible positives which could be taking from it. 
 
The researcher then wanted to know if they believed the current Audit 
Exemption Thresholds should be raised, as respondents conceded 
that it is of very limited use to the company. 
Interviewee A believes the limits are satisfactory at present, but would 
not like to see them reduced. Interviewees B and C believe they should 
be raised in order to relieve further smaller companies from the 
burden of audit, with Interviewee B adding that the actual criteria for 
audit exemption needs to be looked at, for example company limited 
by guarantee. 
 
The above questions needed to be asked in order to examine what 
potential changes should be made to the auditing process, to satisfy 
the second research question of the dissertation. 
 
The final research question explored risks that the subjects perceived 
were important in the context of the profession and the auditing 
process moving forward. 
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Interviewee A believes that intently deceiving the auditor and lack of 
independence are the biggest risks to the auditing profession. They 
expressed concern that only 5% of the transactions of Anglo Irish 
Bank could have been verified during the last audit. 
Interviewee B believes that accounts being prepared by people who are 
not qualified, i.e. accountants is a danger to the future of financial 
reporting and the audit. They are also fearful of the audit report being 
discredited by people not accepting the work auditors do as efficient or 
effective. They are also concerned that self-regulation is not effective 
enough to monitor the profession and does not give a good impression 
to stakeholders and the public. 
Interviewee C believes that failure to improve independent monitoring 
of audits is a significant risk to the future of the statutory audit, 
adding that the process is inherently risky due to sampling, and that 
"the cost of providing 100% reliable audit assurance is prohibitive". 
These are important issues to discover as if the issues are known, 
potential safeguards can be developed and implemented. 
 
In light of recent auditing scandals, the researcher wanted to know 
that if another scandal broke, did the respondents feel the auditing 
profession could recover, as this could spell the end of the profession. 
Interviewee A believes that "the audit profession would lose all 
creditability and therefore would need root and branch reform".  
Interviewees B and C believe that the profession could recover, as 
stated by Interviewee C that "sometimes circumstances mean that 
wrong opinions are sometimes given".  
This was important information to question as the researcher wanted 
to examine how secure it is perceived the future of the audit is. 
 
The researcher will present recommended courses of action and 
conclusions in the following chapter. 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the main findings 
discovered by conducting the primary research and to draw 
conclusions based on these findings. The researcher will then issue 
recommendations derived from the findings. Potential areas of future 
research are suggested. 
 
The researcher conducted the research to gauge how the Statutory 
Audit Directive was being received by the profession, what changes 
should be implemented and what potential risks to the future of the 
Statutory Audit exist. The researcher found little literature in the area 
so felt it was necessary to undertake the research in order to spark 
debate in the area. 
 
The research questions of the dissertation were: 
1. In light of the recent Statutory Audit Directive (SAD) 
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, what 
effects will it have on the auditing process in your firm? 
2. Given your experience of the current audit process, what 
changes would you like to see implemented in the auditing 
process? 
3. In your opinion, what are the biggest risks to the future of the 
auditing process in your firm and what are possible ways to 
negate these risks? 
 
5.2 Conclusions/Recommendations 
Dealing with the first research objective. It is at too early a stage to 
determine how many firms are going to incorporate, however findings 
are consistent with the literature as Spicer and Fahy (2011) identify 
the areas to consider are the lower corporation tax that would be 
applicable and increased administration requirements, as were 
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highlighted by the respondents. The possibility of an outsider auditing 
the company is also a turn-off for the partners. The researcher 
concludes that it is most likely going to be the larger practises which 
benefit from the ability to incorporate, because of the large companies 
they undertake audits of. 
It can be expected that the delivery of an audit report from an 
incorporated audit company will not detract from the quality of the 
opinion, as discovered in the findings. 
The necessity of predecessor auditors to share information with 
successor auditors is being welcomed by the profession. 
Categorised disclosure of remuneration paid to auditors will improve 
the quality of the audit process, according to the results of the 
primary research. 
Mandatory audit firm rotation for PLCs would be welcomed by the 
profession as this can be seen to increase independence and increase 
stakeholder perceptions of the effectiveness of the audit. This is 
consistent with the Commission's beliefs on the matter. 
It can be concluded from the findings that increased regulation is 
wanted by the profession, as the respondents felt that self-regulation 
and national regulation are not effective. This goes against what 
Costello (2010) and Powell (2010) as they believe the auditing 
profession itself should take more responsibility to ensure 
independence, appearing to favour more self-regulation. However as 
demonstrated some of the profession would actually like more 
increased independent regulation, as they feel it would increase 
stakeholder confidence in the audit process. It is recommended by the 
researcher that the interested parties, particularly the European 
Union look at ways of implementing greater regulation as a way of 
restoring investor confidence in the audit. 
The Statutory Audit Directive has had a significant impact on the 
firms investigated and has developed a few issues for them. The 
researcher believes the changes made will be successful in improving 
investor confidence in the audit. 
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With regard to the second research question. The researcher feels that 
an appropriate vehicle is in place to allow all interested parties to 
partake in the discussions on possible changes to the statutory audit 
process. 
In PLCs and other Public Interest companies, it is recommended that 
provision of non-audit services by the auditor should be prohibited, in 
line with findings, as this would increase independence and the 
perceptions of stakeholders. 
With regard to materiality and publishing of verified elements of the 
financial statements, the researcher proposes that the level and 
elements are not disclosed on the audit report, due to concerns 
highlighted by Interviewee B, but that a better explanation of 
materiality, and the use of sampling and judgement by the auditor 
should be provided on the audit report, to clarify any misconceptions 
stakeholders have about the audit process. This is in conflict 
Costello's (2010) belief that materiality should be disclosed. This 
additional substance may go someway in reducing the "Expectation 
Gap" identified by Liggio (1974). This may also reinforce McAlpine's 
(2010) opinion that the current audit report format needs amending. 
Auditors providing information on certain future events would be 
welcomed; however the researcher feels that the auditors may be wary 
of this as they would be verifying or commenting on something which 
has not yet occurred. This information should be highlighted to 
investors by the auditor however, through the vehicle of another 
disclosure separate to the audit report.  
It is recommended that "joint audits" should be implemented for 
Public Interest companies, in order to increase investor confidence in 
the audit reports of such entities. 
It is recommended that the Audit Exemption thresholds are further 
raised and that the criteria for deciding which companies are 
exempted is looked at by the relevant law-makers, as the audit is 
viewed as unimportant for certain smaller companies falling into 
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audit. These findings are in agreement with Lambe and Kenny's (2010) 
belief that the status quo is not acceptable. 
 
Upon investigation of the final research question the researcher 
wishes to make the following recommendation. As already stated, 
additional monitoring would be effective in increasing levels of 
independence and hence, investor confidence on the audit report. 
 
5.3 Areas of Future Research 
As the research was conducted as part of the requirements for the 
Master of Arts in Accounting degree, certain limitations were placed 
on the research, namely lack of resources, constricted time and 
availability of respondents. 
The researcher feels that a potential area of future research could be 
to examine all registered auditors in Ireland to examine how they feel 
the changes in the Statutory Audit Directive have impacted on their 
firm. There is also the potential to examine respondents in other 
European Union countries, as the Statutory Audit Directive is binding 
in their jurisdiction, and compare the results. 
 
The respondents could be questioned on potential changes they feel 
should be made to the Statutory Audit process in order to make it 
more effective for stakeholders. This could then be presented to the 
relevant law-makers and regulators. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This dissertation has aimed to provide an insight into contemporary 
issues surrounding the statutory audit process. After conducting 
primary research, the findings have identified several 
recommendations and conclusions in an attempt to answer the 
research questions identified. Certain limitations of the research 
however have been highlighted. Potential areas of future research have 
been identified by the researcher in an effort to increase the 
knowledge that exists on the issues. 
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Appendices 
Interviews 
Interviewee A 
1. How many people are employed by the firm?   2  
2. How many audits are conducted each year (approx.)? 10-12 
 
3. Are you aware of the recent Statutory Audit Directive signed into 
Irish Law on 20th May 2010?  Yes – basically it states that audit 
firms can now incorporate. It also states that an individual must 
sign the audit report issued for the company, there is now a duty 
that Auditors must provide "transparency reports" when auditing 
certain large entities. There is also the requirement to provide 
information to new auditors.  
 
4. Would you incorporate the auditing part of your firm, 
advantages/disadvantages? It is currently being considered as a 
possibility for the practise, both from a limited liability and tax 
planning perspective. The Advantages are Limited liability and 
Tax Planning opportunities and the low corporation tax rate. The 
disadvantages are the additional corporate responsibility and 
Company Secretarial obligations, so we have to evaluate whether 
it is worth it or not given the small volume of audits we conduct 
every year. 
 
5. What firms do you think it will benefit most? There are certain 
benefits for both large and small firms; however large firms 
should benefit the most from the change, because of their 
exposure to potential large liability when auditing large 
companies and PLCs.  
 
6. Do you foresee many firms incorporating the auditing branch of 
their firms? Large firms or small firms? Over time yes, but many 
will have to consider the legal implications first and may possibly 
adopt a wait and see approach to see how many of the 
competition incorporate. Many may not like the idea of having 
external auditors reviewing their practice 
 
7. If your incorporated audit company required an audit, how would 
you feel about a member of the competition auditing your 
company? Not great. I think I would consider getting an auditor 
from another county with no local interests, not doing any 
business in the area or my jurisdiction to conduct the audit as it 
reduces the risk of giving out important information about 
clients. It is to keep the integrity of the clients. 
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8. Do you think being audited by an incorporated audit company 
will be perceived as improving/detracting the audit process 
because of the limited liability concept? No I don't. I think the 
idea of partners personal responsibility in the event of liability is 
an antiquated concept, particularly considering the litigious 
society we now live in and stakeholders will appreciate that equal 
care has gone into preparing the audit regardless of limited 
liability.  
 
9. Do you think the requirement for predecessor auditors to share 
information with successor auditors will improve the audit 
process? In theory yes, but up till now most firms will provide 
this information anyway, but it is just putting a legal necessity on 
the transaction, but it should improve the process as you are 
perhaps getting alerted to potential areas of danger or more 
arduous areas. 
 
10. Do you think auditors having to disclose how much they receive 
under each heading (tax, audit, other assurance) will make 
investors question how independent the auditors are? Yes I think 
it will. I think investors will question independence if large fees 
are received for tax /other assurance vis a vis the audit fee.  
 
11. Do you think the audit partner having to sign the audit report 
personally will increase investor confidence in the audit opinion? 
I can't see it making much of a difference because most auditors 
take great care in preparing their work anyway. However it is 
possible to dupe an auditor if a company so wishes, particularly 
in large entities, where it is impossible to audit each and every 
transaction. An auditor can fulfil the requirements of an audit 
and still give the wrong opinion. Therefore having an auditor 
personally responsible will not materially reduce the risk if a 
client is intently pulling the wool over the auditor. We just have to 
hope that the auditor catches it. 
 
12. Another change is the way Public Interest companies' (large 
PLCs & Financial institutions) audits are inspected. It is now up 
to IAASA to monitor these audits, not the professional 
accountancy bodies; do you think this will improve the audit of 
these entities? I think that is unlikely, as in my own experience 
and anecdotally talking with other auditors, the professional 
accountancy bodies are extremely strict with their practicing 
audit members. And most auditors carry out their duties with the 
utmost care. Again as before if a company intently dupes an 
auditor it can cause difficulties.  
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13. Are you aware of how the process of the issuance of EU Green 
Papers works? No, I rely on the professional body to keep me 
informed on these matters. Maybe larger audit firms may look at 
matters at an EU level, but the accountancy bodies do a good 
enough job in my opinion. 
 
14. What correspondence does the professional accounting bodies 
issue in relation to an EU Green Paper? Reasonable 
correspondence outlining the concepts that are proposed or are 
being introduced and the requirements of these in the monthly 
journals, so we know what we have to do for the current 
accounting period. 
 
15. Are you happy with the way this process is conducted? Again 
maybe larger firms may have issues, but for our purposes, its 
basically irrelevant so I have no feelings either way.  
 
16. Do you think practising accountants/auditors have enough 
input in the process? The professional bodies have given input, 
but I'm not sure if its enough, perhaps more advice should be 
taking from these than law makers and regulators. 
 
17. Do you think there should be mandatory audit firm rotation as 
opposed to audit partner rotation after 7 years, and after how 
many years should they be rotated? I think there should be 
Mandatory Rotation of firms, which in theory, should lead to 
better audit practice as the current firm will be conscious of a 
successor firm following on and reviewing their work. I feel that 7 
years may be too long, 5 years may be more appropriate.  
 
18. Should auditors be allowed to provide non-audit services (tax, 
accounts preparation, consultancy) when providing the audit? 
This is a difficult area. Auditors should be independent and 
therefore not provide tax accountancy etc to audit clients. 
However by doing this the compliance cost for audit clients will be 
adversely affected if they have to "shop around" for tax/accounts 
prep advice, particularly if the audit client is a small firm which 
requires an audit (management company, company limited by 
guarantee etc). But certainly for public interest companies 
auditors should be independent and therefore I do not think they 
should provide additional services to a company they are 
auditing.  
 
19. Should the materiality to which the auditors work be disclosed 
on the auditor's report? Yes I think it should, as the audit should 
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be an independent and an honest view of the company, by 
disclosing the materiality that we work to sets the parameters for 
the audit and gives assurance to the stakeholder and readers of 
the financial statements as to their accuracy.  
 
20. Do you think that components of the accounts which have been 
verified should be published in the audit report? Yes I think they 
should, again to show independence and establishing what has 
been verified provides confidence to the stakeholder and 
highlights what areas have not been verified, and how much work 
the auditor has put in to the audit. 
 
21. Would you be happy reporting/disclosing information on certain 
future events which may affect the audited company? What 
information do you feel would be important for investors to 
know/be made aware of?  I would agree that the role needs to 
evolve to take into account more forward-looking information, 
and for the auditor to give opinions not just on the financial 
statements, but also on areas such as the company's internal 
controls, corporate governance arrangements and the financial 
assumptions underlying the business model. I think that by 
doing this, auditors will better meet the needs of stakeholders 
who are calling out for the auditors views on the general 
economic and financial outlook of the company. This will help 
address the so-called "expectations gap" of auditing by providing 
more information to the stakeholders. 
 
22. Do you think investors need to better educate themselves as to 
what an audit actually involves, not what they think it involves in 
order to address the expectation gap also? Yes I think perhaps 
they should try to understand a little better the use of sampling, 
judgement and materiality as concepts central to how audits are 
conducted, and that they are for the good of the company and 
shareholders but also not to put excessive costs on the company. 
 
23. Do you think the process of a third party selecting an audit firm 
for say, a bank, or other important financial institutions should 
be implemented? Yes in general. If an independent or statutory 
government body was set up to carry out that function and the 
selection process was transparent and based on a defined set of 
parameters, whereby every tendering audit firm has equal 
opportunity, this should make it better.   
 
24. Do you think "Joint Audits" should be used for such important 
institutions or public listed companies? Well essentially this is a 
review situation and while it may lead to effectively double audit 
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fees for the "auditee", it would bring further confidence to the 
audit report, the fact that two firms have examined the company. 
 
25. How important do you think an audit is to a relatively small 
company run by its owner and what areas do you think it 
provides value in such a company? Audits provide relatively little 
additional value to an owner managed company, over and above 
standard financial statements preparation. Perhaps it may 
identify areas of weak management or maybe identify fraud 
within the company by employees etc. but a good owner manager 
should see these issues anyway.  
 
26. Would you like to see the audit exemption thresholds 
reduced/increased, why/why not? The thresholds are reasonable 
at present, there certainly is no argument to have them reduced 
as this only increases the compliance costs for already struggling 
firms.   
 
27. What do you think are the biggest risks to the auditing 
profession, for example another Enron-type scandal? How do you 
think these could be prevented? The lack of independence is the 
first risk and intentional deceiving of the auditor as seen by the 
recent bank scandals, whereby loans were covered up, are the 
biggest issues threatening the profession at present. It could be 
argued that in some of the giant companies, unless there are full 
time independent auditors reviewing all material transactions, it 
is very difficult to too uncover all unethical or even illegal 
practices in the course of a normal audit. It has been stated that 
the last audit on Anglo Irish Bank less than 5% of all 
transactions could have been audited in the time permitted.  
 
28. Do you think the auditing profession could recover from another 
Enron-type scandal? If another scandal of that nature broke, I 
feel that it is likely that the audit profession would lose all 
creditability and therefore would need root and branch reform. It 
is difficult to see how the profession could recover without 
complete overhaul.  
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Interviewee B 
1. How many people are employed by the firm? 15 
2. How many audits are conducted each year?  40 
 
3. Are you aware of the recent Statutory Audit Directive signed 
into Irish Law on 20th May 2010?  
Yes. It is important as practising, competent auditors in the 
profession that you keep up to date with all new laws and 
regulations which come into effect and to which the firm must 
abide by other wise you could be leaving yourself open to 
litigation. It means auditors have to personally sign the audit 
report, and have the option of forming limited liability companies. 
These are the two most pressing areas which have impacted on 
our firm. 
 
4. Would you incorporate the auditing part of your firm? No. 
Although there are advantages such as limited liability and lower 
corporation tax payable, I fell that partnership has worked well 
for us so far and currently our firm does not envisage 
incorporating the auditing element of the practise. 
 
5. What firms do you think it will benefit most?  
I feel it depends on the client base of your firm. I foresee a lot of 
the larger firms incorporating, as they undertake audits for 
some really large scale companies and even public listed 
companies and so are leaving themselves open to large liability. 
The "limited liability" concept will certainly help these 
companies and reassure their partners a bit more, with regard 
to potential losses and litigation. But currently our set up 
satisfies our needs adequately as our clients are of a smaller 
nature, and they are easier to handle than a large PLC with 
regard to number of transactions and desire to commit fraud. 
 
6. Do you foresee many firms incorporating the auditing branch of 
their firms? Large firms or small firms?  
I feel it will be more the larger firms incorporating the auditing 
part of their firms because of the potential for litigation and large 
payouts required from indemnity insurance. 
 
7. If your incorporated audit company required an audit, how 
would you feel about a member of the competition auditing your 
company?  
This is probably the main reason myself and my partners have 
decided against incorporating the auditing aspect of the firm. We 
feel it would be inappropriate for us to allow our competition 
access to our work practises, accounts, client lists and prices 
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charged as it could result in the loss of customers. Not allowing 
outsiders access to our accounts is one of the major advantages 
to having a "partnership". 
 
8. Do you think being audited by an incorporated audit company 
will be perceived as improving/detracting the audit process 
because of the limited liability concept? Yes, I feel it will detract 
from the quality of the audit opinion as it is being issued by 
someone with limited liability when it comes to them stating their 
opinion. I feel the person/firm should be confident of issuing the 
opinion without using the protection of "limited liability". They 
should be conducting their work in a professional manner and if 
so should not require the protection of "limited liability". 
 
9. Do you think the requirement for predecessor auditors to share 
information with successor auditors will improve the audit 
process? Why? Yes I think this will improve the audit process, 
and I will give you a tangible example. Recently we conducted an 
audit of a company, and although firms generally do allow access 
to some papers, having access to all papers from the predecessor 
auditor really allowed us to get to grips with the assignment 
much quicker. I feel we did do a better job because we had the 
access to their previous working papers used for the audit. And 
more importantly for the client able to do a cheaper job as it took 
us less hours to complete the audit. This is an important aspect 
for the client, especially in the current economic climate where 
they are monitoring costs closely and accountancy fees can 
sometimes be perceived as excessive as management believe they 
are not adding value to their operations but rather just 
compliance so to be able to charge a lower amount to the client 
certainly improved our relationship and saved some hassle for us 
here in the firm with regard to collecting fees. This will allow us 
but also force us, and other firms, to become more efficient and 
more competitive in order to do a better job for our clients at a 
keener price. 
 
10. Do you think auditors having to disclose how much they receive 
under each heading (tax, audit, other assurance) will make 
investors question how independent the auditors are?  
I think this is right. The facts are the facts and they should be 
disclosed to the interested stakeholders and these are important 
areas/issues. I think potentially they could be seen as less 
independent because of the amounts they receive from providing 
these other services so this will give investors something to think 
about so hopefully this step will improve the audit process and 
value of the audit report. There is no point people hiding how 
much money they are getting form the audit and then putting it 
onto other sources, for example charging X for an audit but then 
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compensating by charging excessive fees for tax compliance in 
order to make up for it. 
 
11. Do you think the audit partner having to sign the audit report 
personally will increase investor confidence in the audit opinion? 
Yes I think it will as they are seeing a name rather than just, say 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
 
12. Another change implemented is the way Public Interest 
companies' (large PLCs & Financial institutions) audits are 
inspected. It is now up to IAASA to monitor these audits, not the 
professional accountancy bodies, do you think this will improve 
the audit of these entities?  
Not really no, the Chartered Accountants Ireland Regulatory 
Board (CARB) is strict enough. I do not see how IAASA will be any 
more beneficial. I think the audit monitoring system needs to be 
bigger than the country, for example European-wide. When you 
have so very few dominant firms, the Big 4, CARB or IAASA, are 
no good, I feel it is just a change of name for the same current 
existing structure, what I feel is needed is a European regulatory 
framework for the auditing profession so that if a member of the 
Big 4 is doing a job in Ireland they have profound implications 
throughout their network in the European Union and as far as 
regulation is concerned I believe, local small regulation is not 
effective. Its the same situation with the banks. Having 2 or3 
banks they have too much power and of the 4 audit firms they 
have too much power, so to me it is not dealing with the issue 
whatsoever. I think European Regulation is required. 
 
13. Are you aware of how the process of the issuance of EU Green 
Papers works? No I do not have any knowledge of how this 
process is undertaking. I feel it is more important for my firm to 
learn what is actually coming into law for the relevant accounting 
periods for which we are undertaking work. 
 
14. What correspondence does the professional accounting bodies 
issue in relation to the EU Green Paper? I think they detail these 
issues in the journals they produce but I tend not take much 
interest in these and concentrate more on the newly signed laws 
or regulations to which we must abide and ensure that our staff 
are in compliance with these. For example with the SAD, from X 
date or accounting period starting on this date such and such 
will be enacted, like personally signing the audit report, so it is 
like it's a full year before the necessary regulation is implemented 
so change takes a long time in this profession. So whatever audit 
you do it is going to be the next year before you ensure 
compliance with said regulation and sign the audit report. 
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15. So do you think this should be the task of larger accountancy 
firms rather than small firms? No I think everybody – large firms 
and small firms- should be inputting in the process. I am aware 
that there is a process that they send things out, Exposure drafts 
or what have you, saying this is going to be changed with regard 
to tax and so on, what is your opinion on this and I do feel it is 
important that everyone has an input. But I feel that sometimes 
larger firms have a very standardised input especially with an EU 
approach, where they believe on size fits all and certain changes 
should be applied right across the board. They may have little 
regard as to what effects these changes will have on smaller 
companies as much of their clients are larger firms, so for this 
reason I fell it is important that everyone has a say in the changes 
that are being made. 
 
16. Do you think there should be mandatory audit firm rotation as 
opposed to audit partner rotation after 7 years, and after how 
many years should they be rotated?  
No I do not see how this will improve the process for smaller firms 
anyway as it is useful to build up relationships with your 
customers in order to provide a better service. I would not like to 
be losing clients I have had for 7 years as I would have to be more 
active in looking for new clients and I do not feel it detracts from 
the work we do at present, to be associated with a client for more 
than 7 years. For larger companies this may be useful and I 
would agree with mandatory rotation of audit firms after 7 years 
for PLCs and Banks. 
 
17. Should auditors be allowed to provide non-audit services (tax, 
accounts preparation, consultancy) when providing the audit?  
Yes they should so long as it is fully disclosed I think it is not a 
problem and does not detract from the audit process. I think the 
auditor providing consultancy services or acting as management 
should not be allowed though, as this would breach or 
compromise their position in the organisation/company. I think 
allowing auditors to provide those other services (tax and 
accounts preparation) could improve the quality of the audit as if 
they know they are providing that service they will ensure that it 
is done correctly anyway within the firm. This can reduce costs 
for the company and the advantages of this have already been 
explained. The auditors provision of these other services can 
improve the audit as they become more aware of how the 
company operates and can gain more of an understanding of 
everything about the company, for example the mentality of 
management and culture of the organisation and perhaps the 
potential amongst employees/management for fraud and the 
potential areas where fraud may occur. 
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18. Should the materiality to which the auditors work be disclosed 
on the auditor's report? This has been discussed by regulators 
and law makers. No I don't think that it should be disclosed on 
the audit report. There are two sides to this issue. If an investor 
can look at the audit report and see that this is the 
figure/accuracy to which the auditor worked and so these 
figures/amounts should not be left out of the accounts this 
should improve communications between the parties. But if 
someone within the company wants to commit fraud, they know 
at what level the auditor will not look for so, for example if they 
want to embezzle monies, they distribute the payments in 
figures/sums at less than the materiality level to which the 
auditors work, so it cuts both ways. Perhaps the audit report 
should better explain materiality or what it is, but to give a value 
I do not think that this should happen. 
 
19. Do you think that components of the accounts which have been 
verified should be published in the audit report? This would be 
more detail on the audit work the auditor has undertaking. No I 
think for the same reasons as before, giving the information to 
the wrong people. In our audit plans we set out that a certain per 
centage of fixed assets, receivables, creditors, suppliers, bank 
reconciliations, etc, have to be verified. However I do not think 
that this information should be disclosed as certain information 
can be manipulated for other people's more sinister benefits 
aswell. 
 
20. So do you think that investors need to better educate 
themselves with the audit reporting process and contents of the 
auditors report? Yes I feel they need to be better educated. What 
may be useful is an explanatory note or statement on what 
materiality is, explain it, a statement on how an audit process 
takes place, and how sample based techniques are employed by 
the auditor and they do not look at every transaction. There 
needs to be an explanation that materiality, judgement and 
sampling are used and all the work that auditors do is linked 
together. 
 
21. Would you be happy reporting/disclosing information on certain 
future events which may affect the audited company? We 
currently look at possible events for the next 12-month period 
that the audit report is signed; we do look ahead and look for 
possible difficulties. The audit report is to provide assurance on 
what has happened up to that date, such as these are the right 
figures. But going concern we examine issues like is there enough 
money to keep the business going.  
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What information do you feel would be important for investors? 
Going concern issues are key for investors. Issues do arise for the 
company, but beyond 12 months it is very difficult to foresee or 
plan for or disclose for. Even within 12 months is difficult, I have 
had companies that within 3 months have gone from being in a 
very secure situation to a situation where it may not exist or 
survive – perhaps because of loss of a key client. This is topical 
now with companies regularly going out of business, or a 
depression in the market, or withdrawal of finance from the bank.  
 
22. Do you think the process of a third party selecting an audit firm 
for say, a bank, or other important financial institutions should 
be implemented? I thought this was the task of the audit 
committee. It would depend on who the third party was, certain 
elements of governments have be proven to be corrupt so this 
could be another area subject to this and this would not be 
adding value to the audit process. But no I feel it should be left to 
the audit committee and the firm should be changed every 7 
years. 
 
23. Do you think "Joint Audits" should be used for such important 
institutions or large PLCs? Yes I think this is a good idea and 
should improve the audit of such large institutions and provide 
more assurance to stakeholders.  
 
24. How important do you think an audit is to a relatively small 
company run by its owner and what areas do you think it 
provides value in such a company? I do not think it is at all 
important to such a company; the limits are now so high that it 
has excluded a lot of family owned companies. I do not see any 
benefits for such a company to have an audit. I believe that it is 
more important that the accounts are prepared by qualified 
registered accountants and meet the companies acts; I feel this is 
more important rather than an actual audit. Sole traders do not 
have to audit their accounts and I know some sole traders who 
are as big as some of the companies which require an audit but 
the sole trader does not. 
 
25. Would you like to see the audit exemption thresholds 
reduced/increased, why/why not? I would like to see them 
increased in order to reduce the burden of an audit on these 
companies and as I said with regard to the sole traders, they do 
not require an audit, so it should be left up to the individual 
management to decide on whether or not they would like to have 
an audit. I would like to see the requirements for audits looked at 
again, for example, small charities or a company limited by 
guarantee have to have an audit and cannot claim audit 
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exemption even though they may only have a turnover of 
€100,000. 
 
26. What do you think are the biggest risks to the auditing 
profession, if there is one thing you think that is going to be a 
problem? How do you think these could be prevented? I believe 
that there needs to be a regulation where it is only qualified 
accountants allowed to prepare accounts for companies and sole 
traders both, as this would improve quality of preparation and 
make the statements more valued by users. For example a 
company fulfilling the audit exemption requirements with 
turnover €6 million, 40 employees, net assets €2.5 million, can 
have their accounts prepared by unqualified people. For example 
there needs to be a similar system as to what is operated in the 
USA. We need to have more tax audits for smaller owner-
managed companies as they want to ensure compliance with tax 
system so that they do not get fined for non-compliance. The 
accounts are prepared for the taxman and the bank is just 
secretary. The biggest risk to the auditing profession is the 
complete discredited audit report. The audit report needs to be 
focused, kept very specific. There is no point us saying we are 
auditing something we cannot audit. 
 
27. Do you think the auditing profession could recover from another 
Enron-type scandal? I do not think that self regulation is a good 
idea, I do not think that local regulation is a good idea, I think the 
profession needs international regulation is a good idea, 
especially for PLC and the likes, such important institutions. It 
will survive, audits have become very checklist based and not 
sitting back and looking at the bigger picture. It seems to me to 
be very much a box-ticking exercise, not seeing the wood for the 
trees. Too much box-ticking and not sitting back and thinking, 
right how is this company going to survive. 
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Interviewee C 
1. How many people are employed by the firm?  16 & 3 Partners 
2. How many audits are conducted each year (approx.)?  40 
 
3. Are you aware of the recent Statutory Audit Directive signed 
into Irish Law on 20th May 2010?  
Yes, it is an important issue for us in the last year. It allows us to 
incorporate the auditing part of the practise, and we must 
personally sign the audit reports of the audits we conduct. 
 
4. In light of this would you incorporate the auditing part of your 
firm? 
We are considering it at the moment, so there is consultation 
going on between the 3 partners as to what our next move should 
be. The advantages of it are limited liability and tax planning 
opportunities for the practice and the partners. 
 
The big disadvantage is the hassle of re-registration. 
 
5. Similar to the factors a sole trader must evaluate when deciding 
on whether or not to incorporate. Yes that's a similar situation. 
We think that the big one (issue) is the increased burden of filing 
and paperwork. Although we have a good team here so we should 
be able to keep on top of it should we decide to incorporate the 
auditing section. 
  
6. What firms do you think it will benefit most? 
Initially the bigger firms will benefit, as they carry out audits for 
the larger companies, where they are exposing themselves to 
large potential liability in the event of something going wrong. I 
think partners in these firms may be interested in incorporating 
for these reasons. 
 
7. Do you foresee many firms incorporating the auditing branch of 
their firms?  
I think that most firms will incorporate eventually, it will probably 
become the norm as far as the auditing profession goes. The 
corporation tax rate is attractive to partners, and allows for 
reinvestment in the practise. And as mentioned the limited 
liability aspect, as if other professions are allowed it we should we 
not be. 
 
8. If your incorporated audit company required an audit, how 
would you feel about a member of the competition auditing your 
company? 
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The company would not require an audit at this point, due to 
the large audit exemption thresholds.  However if it did I would 
have no problem with another company doing it, things are so 
standardised now that it would not be a problem. However I do 
see how this would be a problem for say the Big 4 firms or the 
other larger firms. 
 
9. Do you think being audited by an incorporated audit company 
will be perceived as improving/detracting the audit process 
because of the limited liability concept?  
I don't believe it will change the perception of the audit at all. The 
profession has to be so careful not to issue a wrong opinion for 
fear of litigation that we have to act professionally and ensure 
everything is in order. Once people see that the same things are 
being done in an audit by an audit company, they will 
understand that the same service is being delivered, so again it 
will just become the norm. 
 
10. Do you think the requirement for predecessor auditors to share 
information with successor auditors will improve the audit 
process? 
A lot of auditors tended to do this anyway, as it was, I suppose 
good auditor etiquette, we all help each other out as we know how 
difficult the work can be, so this would have been good practice 
anyway but yes I think it will improve the process, especially on 
larger or perhaps complicated audits, access to this information 
is useful to alert you to areas that need most attention. Not that 
anything sinister may be going on but just the areas that need 
the work to comply with the standards. But yes I suppose for 
auditing really large institutions, a bank, it should improve the 
process. 
 
11. Do you think auditors having to disclose how much they receive 
under each heading (tax, audit, other assurance) will make 
investors question how independent the auditors are? 
Maybe, it probably should as if they are receiving more than say 
50% of the audit fee in other areas, it is probably going to be a 
significant amount and could again, compromise independence. 
However it is up to the perception of the investors as to what 
constitutes a significant amount, and of how effective they think 
the auditors are. 
 
12. Do you think the audit partner having to sign the audit report 
personally will increase investor confidence in the audit opinion? 
No not really, the firm's name would be on it so it could be 
found out who conducted the audit anyway. 
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13. Another change is the way Public Interest companies' (large 
PLCs & Financial institutions) audits are inspected. It is now up 
to IAASA to monitor these audits, not the professional 
accountancy bodies; do you think this will improve the audit of 
these entities? 
Yes, it is increased monitoring so I feel this is necessary in order 
to improve the quality of audits further. 
 
14. Are you aware of how the process of the issuance of EU Green 
Papers works? 
Yes I like to keep informed on how these affect our profession. 
 
15. What correspondence does the professional accounting bodies 
issue in relation to an EU Green Paper? 
We are notified through professional bulletins by the bodies and 
Accountancy Ireland run articles on the new developments or 
proposed developments which are going to affect the profession. 
 
16. Are you happy with the way this process is conducted and do 
you think all stakeholders have enough input? 
Yes I feel it is conducted fine, they get the feedback and make 
amendments before issuing the standard or regulation, whatever 
the case may be. The parties that are interested have enough 
access to the process if they take the time to educate themselves 
or read about what changes are happening and to have an input 
on them via the professional accountancy bodies, etc. 
 
17. Do you think there should be mandatory audit firm rotation as 
opposed to audit partner rotation after 7 years, and after how 
many years should they be rotated? 
No I don't believe mandatory rotation should happen at all.  I 
think independence and standards will be better maintained 
through more effective independent monitoring of auditors. It 
again goes back to the threat of litigation, auditors have to ensure 
they are not leaving themselves open to liability, and increased 
monitoring should occur. 
 
18. Do you think that auditors should be allowed to provide non-
audit services (tax, accounts preparation, consultancy) when 
providing the audit? 
In small companies I don't see this as a problem, so tax and 
accounts preparation should be allowed as long as independence 
of auditor can be clearly explained. But in large companies, no I 
don't think that these services should be provided by the auditor. 
They are auditing their own preparation, and other work, so 
independence could be compromised, so no. 
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19. Should the materiality to which the auditors work be disclosed 
on the auditor's report? 
We Accountants/Auditors use our professional judgement to 
decide the level of Materiality that is appropriate on a job by job 
basis. I think disclosing or explaining this would lead to more 
confusion as accounts users, in general, will not understand 
specific issues relating to a particular job or that significant 
differences in Materiality can exist between jobs but still provide 
the same service or assurance. 
 
20. Do you think that components of the accounts which have been 
verified should be published in the audit report? 
No, again for a similar reason as above, different areas may 
require more/less work, and it may confuse if we verify one area 
in a certain audit and do not do it in another audit. 
 
21. Would you be happy reporting/disclosing information on certain 
future events which may affect the audited company? What 
information do you feel would be important for investors to 
know/be made aware of? 
The current standards that we have to comply with require that 
an auditor considers the impact of post balance sheet events.  We 
also have to form an opinion on certain estimates in the accounts 
which relate to the future.  I believe these standards are adequate 
if the auditor is doing his job properly. 
 
22. Do you think the process of a third party selecting an audit firm 
for say, a bank, or other important financial institutions should 
be implemented? 
No – again I think more effective independent monitoring of 
auditors is the most effective way to ensure proper standards and 
to safeguard the future of audits of such entities. 
 
23. Do you think "Joint Audits" should be used for such important 
institutions or public listed companies? 
I don't think so as they are very hard to manage and perhaps the 
responsibility for the audit opinion may be diminished.  
 
24. How important do you think an audit is to a relatively small 
company run by its owner and what areas do you think it 
provides value in such a company? 
I feel that an audit has very limited value in this situation as the 
owner is able to keep tabs on how the company is operating 
themselves. 
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25. Would you like to see the audit exemption thresholds 
reduced/increased, why/why not? 
Yes – again as the audit is of very little value to small companies 
so these could be further raised. 
 
26. What do you think are the biggest risks to the auditing 
profession, for example another Enron-type scandal? How do you 
think these could be prevented? 
I think improved independent monitoring will help maintain 
standards and reduce the risk of these scandals.  However they 
will not eliminate these issues as the cost of providing 100% 
reliable audit assurance is prohibitive. 
 
27. Do you think the auditing profession could recover from another 
Enron-type scandal?  
Yes, I think the profession is robust enough and people see that 
sometimes circumstances mean that wrong opinions are 
sometimes given. 
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Definitions/Abbreviations 
ACCA: Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
Big 4: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, Ernst & 
Young 
CAI: Chartered Accountants Ireland 
CPA: Certified Public Accountants 
FRC: Financial Reporting Council 
FS: Financial Statements 
IAASA: Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority 
IAASB: International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
ICAEW: Institute of Chartered Accountants England and Wales 
ICAS: Institute of Chartered Accountants Scotland 
IOSCO: International Organisation of Securities Commission 
Public Interest Entity (PIE): companies whose transferable securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market of any member state (of 
the EU), credit institutions, insurance undertakings. 
SAD: Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC 
SME: Small & Medium Enterprise 
SMP: Small & Medium Practitioners  
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